The electoral system and the guaranteed seats favor brave new non-majority actors with even minimal levels of voter support, regardless of the level of Serb participation, and can turn them into political kingmakers at local and national levels. Boycotts are a self-defeating strategy, and civil resistance is a good short-term strategy to mobilize and draw attention, but not one that guarantees solutions. The electoral year of 2025 is the moment of truth for Kosovo Serbs.
Slightly more than a year ago, as the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements between Kosovo and Serbia began to unravel, it was not clear who was effectively in control of Kosovo’s fragile Serbian-majority north. Was it Serbia through Milan Radojcic’s criminal networks, coupled with the parallel Serbian state institutions which distribute most of the available jobs and benefits? Was it Kosovo’s government with its Special Police forces implementing Kosovo’s laws alongside the newly elected Albanian mayors (with 1-3% of the vote), using the vacuum created by local Serbs who abandoned institutions? Was it the status-neutral KFOR and EULEX missions with their ground operations and the diplomatic weight of their Embassies?
The Struggle for Control in Kosovo's North
The competition for control over the north was marked by a constant probing and testing of the limits of this power vacuum by the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia, Albin Kurti and Aleksandar Vucic. Their calculus was also affected by the wider geopolitical uncertainty created by the war in Ukraine, but also the need to satisfy the anxiety of domestic nationalist audiences. This period of probing and poking at the other side came to a swift end with the Banjska attack, the ultimate result of which was a completely new reality on the ground – much more different than the one the attackers had intended. When the Serbian insurgents led by Radojcic were quickly repelled by Kosovo Police in cooperation with NATO peacekeepers, some interpreted this as Vucic overplaying his hand in the current geopolitical environment, falling into Kurti’s trap and giving the latter a political win. After Banjska, Vucic became subdued and aimed to restore the damage to his image in the West. Kosovo’s security structures used this to effectively walk through open doors in the north, establishing their full control over the territory and dismantling almost all Serbian parallel institutions (save for health and education ones) without much of a response from Belgrade.
Yet to describe this new reality as a win for Kosovo’s sovereignty is a tall task because the situation remains unsustainable and unproductive in the long run. Territories can’t be effectively and justly controlled if most of the population view the ruling institutions as illegitimate and are hostile to them. The current climate of mistrust is a recipe for constant tensions and incidents, as we have already seen happen with Serbian community protests and police overreactions that often agitate the situation further. Kosovo Serbs from the north are trapped into this pendulum of Kurti’s and Vucic’s attempts to score political wins, and the constantly shifting geopolitical circumstances of the past decade. For the past year they have been on the receiving end of efforts by the Kosovo government to assert sovereignty through a securitized approach which, similarly to chemotherapy, kills many of the positive cells needed for the attempted integration.
For example, in the name of the battle to establish rule of law, the government and its proxies have regularly attacked or been dismissive to the concerns of Kosovo Serb civil society groups working on inter-ethnic cooperation and offered patronizing lectures on who and how should represent Serbian community interests. The government has also recklessly affected the livelihoods of ordinary citizens benefiting from things like Serbian state pensions without offering alternative solutions. Symbolic gestures like the removal of Cyrillic from signposts (a constitutional right) and the triumphant promotion of such actions in the media have signaled to the Serbs more of a desire for Albanian domination rather than establishment of rule of law.
This approach is not exactly the best formula to win hearts and minds and to signal an openness for Kosovo Serbs to participate in Kosovo’s political and social life. As such, it is not exactly a sustainable strategy for Kosovo’s efforts to assert its sovereignty, which ultimately depends on people’s willingness to legitimize it. Not to mention the huge international cost that this strategy has exerted for Kosovo, damaging its credibility with allies and affecting its efforts to join international institutions. If anything, this approach has entrenched Kosovo Serbs further towards Belgrade as a source of protection and support. Kosovo Serbs might not be able to receive their Serbian-government benefits within Kosovo, now that institutions like the postal bank are no longer in place. But in response to the situation Belgrade has significantly increased the amounts they can receive at new facilities right across the border.
Kosovo Serbs: Navigating Pressures from Belgrade and Prishtina
Regardless of the “new reality”, a key feature of the old reality persists: Kosovo Serbs remain trapped between the interests of a Belgrade which plays regional hegemonic games on their backs, and the pressures from a government in Prishtina that is open only to Serbs it views as fully loyal and detached from any influence from Belgrade (the number of which is marginal). Most Kosovo Serbs, particularly those in the north, have for a very long time felt that they have no agency or power of their own over developments and – especially after the murder of Oliver Ivanovic - have not had figures of sufficient moral authority to reclaim that agency. Ivanovic’s murder and the regular intimidation of Serbs who dare to go against Belgrade has been a clear deterrent for anyone who has dared to chart an independent course. This has convinced most Kosovo Serbs that the only feasible way for them to participate is to have Belgrade involved and supportive of such participation.
Yet the view prevalent among many Albanians that Kosovo Serbs are reluctant to participate in Kosovo’s institutional life only because of pressures from Belgrade is also somewhat of an illusion. The hostility to Kosovo as state runs deep and is a grassroots sentiment, especially in the north. In fact, one part of the grievance in the north with Belgrade is that it had forced them to integrate into Kosovo institutions after the Brussels agreement in 2013. The recent abandonment of security institutions in 2022 was as much a bottom-up demand from local Serbs agitated by the encroaching powers of Prishtina as it was a political decision from Belgrade.
However, the past year may have offered a lesson to Kosovo Serbs about how damaging and self-defeating the impulsive decision to boycott institutions – including a recent referendum to recall the Albanian mayors of the north - has been for their own self-interests. The idea that Kosovo Serbs can replicate the resistance that Kosovo Albanians waged during the 90’s against Serbia, through a complete withdrawal from the system, and to hope for the same result, may work in the short-term in drawing international attention to their cause and grievances. But in many fundamental ways the reality is incomparable because the formal power sharing instruments that Kosovo Serbs already have in their hand if they chose to participate, as well as those they may be able to obtain through the Brussels dialogue, are incomparable to the regime that Milosevic installed. So are the instruments that Kosovo Serbs have at their disposal for the enforcement of such formal powers, mainly towards through the West’s instruments of pressure towards Kosovo.
A Path Forward: Agency and Participation in Kosovo
It is a welcome sign that a few new political actors in the north are realizing the gravity of the current moment and trying to reassert grassroots domestic agency. It is also healthy for Kosovo’s democracy that they are provoking the system through protests and street actions, regardless of occasional police overreactions, as these are the kind of frictions which through time will make the system stronger. Yet at this point, while it is absolutely necessary for the government in Prishtina to offer Kosovo Serbs the space and security for public engagement, it is equally important for Kosovo Serbs – if they are to have a future in Kosovo - to articulate a positive vision for this future that is compatible with the reality of Kosovo as an independent state, and which acknowledges this as an irreversible reality.
Much as the vision of Albanians in North Macedonia - or other ethnic groups in the Balkans that feel they are stuck on the wrong side of how history determined state borders – this vision does not have to be based on love for the state, as it was clearly not one which they desired. But it can be one in which they establish a relationship with the state based on the mutual respect for their dignity and a belief that they have a stake in it. The opportunities that Kosovo’s constitutional framework already offers, and what additional rights may be obtained through the Brussels dialogue to run schools and hospitals, do offer sufficient space for Kosovo Serbs to be a sustainable community and to feel that they are in charge of their own fate while also being free to preserve ties to Serbia (after all they are double citizens).
All it takes for Kosovo Serbs right now is to show some political agency and to participate at all levels of institutions, starting with the national and local elections in 2025, in which they need to articulate a positive vision of what should happen and signal the start of a new chapter in ethnic relations. The electoral system and the guaranteed seats favor brave new non-majority actors with even minimal levels of voter support, regardless of the level of Serb participation, and can turn them into political kingmakers at local and national levels. Boycotts are a self-defeating strategy, and civil resistance is a good short-term strategy to mobilize and draw attention, but not one that guarantees solutions. The electoral year of 2025 is the moment of truth for Kosovo Serbs.