Between Frustration and Denial: Serbia and Montenegrin Independence Twenty Years On

Twenty years after the Montenegrin independence referendum, the relationship of the dominant political and intellectual elite in Serbia toward Montenegrin statehood has remained deeply burdened by frustration, paternalism, and a refusal to accept political reality. A significant portion of Serbia's political, media, and intellectual elite has not accepted Montenegrin state independence as a legitimate and final fact. Although Montenegro is an internationally recognized state, a NATO member, and on the doorstep of the European Union, in Serbia's prevailing nationalist discourse it is still viewed as an "alienated part of Serbian space" rather than an independent political community with its own identity, interests, and right to sovereign decision-making. For this reason, this year's anniversary was not received in Serbia as an opportunity for rational reexamination of the relations between the two states, but as a pretext for reviving old resentments, political pressures, and open contestation of Montenegrin independence. Aleksandar Vučić's most recent public statements on the occasion of the anniversary have shown that official Belgrade still refuses to come to terms with the fact that Montenegro exists outside the political, identity-based, and symbolic framework of the "Serbian world." Vučić's refusal to attend the commemoration of two decades of Montenegrin independence, accompanied by statements that he was "crucified" and that "Serbs loved Montenegro more than it loved them," is not merely a manifestation of passive aggression by Serbia's autocratic president, but part of a long-standing political strategy in which Montenegro is treated as a space of an unresolved Serbian national question.

Vučić's Policy and the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty

Particularly telling is the fact that Vučić did not address the institutions of Montenegro, but spoke directly to "the citizens of Montenegro." This was yet another demonstration of a political matrix that can be defined as a doctrine of limited sovereignty of Serbia's neighboring states. This thesis proceeds from the fact that Serbia formally recognizes its neighboring states but in practice contests their full right to independent decision-making whenever their decisions are not aligned with the interests of Serbian nationalism and the policy of the Belgrade regime. Under Vučić, Serbia views the region through a hierarchical model of relations in which Vučić claims political, cultural, and identity-based guardianship over neighboring states with populations that identify as Serbs. Consequently, every independent decision made by Montenegro — from recognition of Kosovo, to joining NATO, to ideas about a distinct Montenegrin identity — is perceived as an "anti-Serbian act" rather than a legitimate decision of a sovereign state.

Within such a paradigm, neighboring states can only be accepted insofar as they remain within Serbia's political and symbolic sphere of influence. This is precisely why Montenegrin independence represents a traumatic issue for the nationalist segment of Serbia. It was experienced not merely as the loss of a shared state, but as a political defeat of the idea that Montenegrins are merely a "regional branch of the Serbian people." In the dominant Serbian nationalist narrative, Montenegro is not recognized as a distinct historical and political community, but as a space in which "de-Serbification" has allegedly been carried out. In this discourse, there is no room for the fact that Montenegrin statehood is historically older than modern Serbia, nor for any understanding of Montenegro's complex identity development. Instead, the distinctiveness of the Montenegrin nation, language, and culture is denied, while the very idea of Montenegrin independence is presented as a temporary anomaly to be delegitimized. This amounts to a denial of the right of Montenegrins to independently define their own identity, language, and political destiny. Ultimately, for all these reasons, even twenty years on, Serbia views Montenegrin independence — and indeed its own — not as an opportunity and investment in the future, but as a defeat and a source of frustration.

The Ideology of the "Serbian World" and the Mechanisms of Destabilization of Montenegro

There is no doubt that contemporary Serbian nationalism toward Montenegro operates through a combination of imperial nostalgia and identity-based paternalism. Nationalist Serbia has never fundamentally accepted the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the disappearance of the idea of Belgrade as the center of political unification of the South Slavs. Following the collapse of the Yugoslav project (1991), this reflex of dominance was redirected toward the concept of the "Serbian world," which represents a modernized version of the expansionist state policy of the 1990s and an indispensable platform for destructive Russian influence (mirroring the "Russian world"). In this regard, Montenegro occupies a special place. Unlike other neighboring states, it is not perceived in the Serbian nationalist imaginary as "otherness" but as "temporarily seized territory." This is precisely why the attitude toward Montenegrin statehood is far more emotional and aggressive than toward other states in the region. In the dominant intellectual and political thought in Serbia, Montenegro is viewed in a colonial manner — as a space over which Serbia claims the right to determine what constitutes legitimate identity, desirable policy, and "correct" historical consciousness.

In this sense, contemporary Serbian nationalism toward Montenegro operates through several parallel mechanisms:

1. denial of Montenegrin identity;
2. the assimilationist activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) as an irreplaceable political actor and agent of the identity conversion of Montenegrins into Serbs;
3. the constant manufacture of a sense of threat toward Serbs in Montenegro;

4. the maintenance of permanent political instability through support for extreme pro-Serbian and pro-Russian structures.

    

   The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Factor

This policy is particularly visible in the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The SOC in Montenegro is not merely a religious institution, but a key political and ideological actor of Serbian nationalism and an exponent of Serbian and Russian influence. The destabilization, polarization, and radicalization of society in Montenegro through church-organized "processions" — which were essentially well-organized political demonstrations (2019–2020) — demonstrate the extraordinary mobilizing power of the Church, as well as the fact that the religious framework is used for political homogenization against Montenegro's European, civic, and pro-Western identity. Although the Church's mobilizing power has since weakened, the SOC remains a key regional instrument of Serbian "soft power," ready — as in the case of Russian "soft power" — to rapidly transform it into militant acts. Specifically in Montenegro, it also functions as a direct political actor that, through its infrastructure, media, and intelligence apparatus, maintains the destabilizing political influence of the authorities in Belgrade.

This is most visible in the rhetoric about the alleged endangerment of Serbs in Montenegro. For years, Serbian tabloids and pro-government propaganda outlets have been constructing an image of Serbs as a discriminated community denied the right to identity, language, and faith. Such narratives serve a dual function. Within Serbia, they homogenize the electorate by manufacturing an external enemy, while in Montenegro they serve to destabilize and undermine the civic concept of the state. The frequently repeated thesis about alleged endangerment — recognizable wherever Serbian nationalism is not the ruling ideology — along with the narrative of Serbia as the "protector" and "patron" of Serbs in the region, served as a casus belli for the post-Yugoslav conflicts of the last decade of the twentieth century. As long as such narratives are not delegitimized for public and political use, Serbia (with or without Vučić) will remain a key point of regional destabilization and Russian influence in the Western Balkans.

Over the past decade, a defining feature of Vučić's regional policy has been the permanent instigation of crises in order to maintain tensions. Serbia under Vučić does not seek stability grounded in the equality of states, but rather a region in which neighbors remain dependent on the political will of the Belgrade authorities. This is why tensions are constantly manufactured — over identity issues, the status of Serbs, or conflicting historical interpretations. The goal is not the resolution of disputes, but their perpetuation as a tool of political influence. The most obvious example of this was the response to Montenegro's NATO membership. Montenegro's accession to the Alliance in 2017 was not presented in Serbia as a legitimate decision of an independent state regarding one of the most fundamental questions of sovereignty — defense and geostrategic orientation — but was portrayed as an anti-Serbian provocation and the result of a Western conspiracy. In this case, as three years later with North Macedonia's NATO membership, Serbia merely acted as a proxy for the Kremlin regime, with the aim of deterring these two states from making legitimate decisions to join the collective security architecture of the Western world. At the same time, the "attempted terrorism and formation of a criminal organization" in Montenegro during the October 2016 elections demonstrated to what extent pro-Serbian and pro-Russian structures were prepared to prevent Montenegro's final geopolitical distancing from Serbian and Russian spheres of influence.

Historical Revisionism and the Question of Serbia's Internal Identity

Historical revisionism — not unique to contemporary Serbian nationalism — has led to the systematic rehabilitation in Serbia of war criminals and quislings from the Second World War, and under the increasingly radical regime, also the ideological narratives of the 1990s wars; simultaneously, the Yugoslav and antifascist legacy is subjected to discursive delegitimization and demonization. Montenegro, with its strong partisan tradition and history of antifascism, stands in the way of such a reinterpretation of the past. This is why, in the nationalist segment of Serbian public life, Montenegro's insistence on an antifascist identity is perceived as a political and national problem.

Furthermore, the authoritarian regime in Serbia employs a contradictory mixture of victimhood and hegemonism. It is precisely this combination that enables Vučić to conduct a policy of constant emotional blackmail toward Montenegro. When he declares that "Serbs loved Montenegro more than it loved them," he rejects the rational political discourse of sovereign and equal states. Instead, he employs the rhetoric of a defeated imperial center for which the emancipation of a state — projected to remain in the status of an underdeveloped periphery — is perceived as betrayal. Another key revisionist narrative is the thesis positioning Serbs across the region as a diaspora of Serbia. The Republic of Serbia is not the homeland state of Serbs in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Croatia, as they do not constitute a diaspora but rather historically autochthonous communities in those states — their presence is multigenerational and deeply rooted in local social and cultural frameworks.

It is important to understand that the problem of Serbia's relationship toward Montenegro is not merely a matter of Serbian foreign policy, but above all a question of the internal identity of Serbian nationalism. The dominant segment of the political (and intellectual) elite in Serbia has never abandoned the idea that Montenegro must be returned to Serbia's sphere of influence and its prevailing value coordinates. Accepting Montenegro's full sovereignty would mean reconciling oneself with the fact that neighboring states have the right to their own identities, histories, languages, and geopolitical choices — and it is precisely this that the all-pervasive nationalist discourse in Serbia refuses to accept.

Twenty years after the referendum, Montenegro has survived as an independent state despite enormous pressures, driven by internal divisions and external (Serbian-Russian) destabilization efforts. However, the response of nationalist Serbia to that fact shows that the political elites in Belgrade have not yet abandoned the idea of regional dominance, channeled through the allegedly unresolved so-called Serbian question — which, as in previous decades, is still conceived exclusively in its territorial (expansionist) form. This is why the anniversary of Montenegrin independence continues to provoke anxiety, aggressive campaigns, and attempts at the symbolic annulment of Montenegrin statehood and identity. On the other hand, relevant public opinion research shows that an undisputed majority of Serbian citizens view Montenegrin independence as an irreversible historical process whose consequences are rationally accepted.

The Relationship Toward Montenegrin Independence — A Test of Serbia's Democratic Capacity

Finally, nationalist Serbia has never seriously examined its own responsibility for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s. For this reason, Montenegrin independence cannot be regarded as a legitimate consequence of historical processes, but is instead perceived as a continuation of an "anti-Serbian conspiracy." In such an interpretation, Serbia is an eternal victim, while neighboring states are portrayed as products of external influence and hostile policy toward Serbs. Precisely for this reason, Vučić's doctrine of limited sovereignty of Serbia's neighboring states remains the key to understanding and interpreting the contemporary relations between Serbia and Montenegro. It shows that the problem lies not only in individual statements by Aleksandar Vučić or media excesses, but in a Greater Serbian political matrix that views Serbia's neighbors as spaces over which Belgrade claims special political influence.

As long as such a matrix continues to dominate, relations between Serbia and Montenegro will remain burdened by tensions, mistrust, and attempts at political guardianship — just as imperial Russia cannot reconcile itself to the existence of independent states in its neighborhood. The relationship toward Montenegro can therefore today be seen as a kind of test of Serbia's democratic capacity. Only when Serbia accepts Montenegro as a fully equal state — without paternalism, nationalist resentment, contestation of identity, and quasi-imperial nostalgia — will it be possible to speak of genuine democratization and stabilization of the region, and of a lasting normalization of relations among the states that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia.