Local Elections in Kosovo

Between Local Issues and National Burdens

Traditionally, local elections draw significantly less attention than high-profile national contests, such as parliamentary or presidential races, a trend reflected in both lower voter turnout and reduced media coverage. This is paradoxical because local issues – e.g. communal services, infrastructure, waste management, and local economic development - affect citizens most directly in their daily lives. Nevertheless, local elections are generally perceived as less significant, as their decisions are narrower in scope, affect smaller constituencies, and differ in nature - lacking the dramatic, high-stakes political conflicts that dominate the national arena.

However, in the context of Kosovo, due to its specificity as a deeply divided post-conflict society, local elections are constantly burdened by “national” questions that transcend municipal bounds. 

These upcoming elections are no different, but they are uniquely distinguished by a profound institutional crisis in Serb-majority North of Kosovo. This crisis is rooted in a fundamental conflict between the central government's drive for full sovereignty and the local Serb community's corresponding demand for collective security and self-governance.

The Political Shift and Boycott

After years of dominance and political monopoly of Kosovo Serb political spectrum by the Srpska Lista (Serb List) - widely considered an political proxy of the ruling party in Serbia - the situation has changed. Following a series of unilateral and escalatory moves by the government of Kosovo's Prime Minister Albin Kurti, on November 5, 2022[1], Serbs from the North of Kosovo left all Kosovo institutions, including local self-governments - most notably the positions of mayors and municipal assembly members, which were dominated by Srpska Lista.

New extraordinary local elections for the these four Serb-majority municipalities in the North were called and held on April 23, 2023[2]. However, due to "unfulfilled demands" set forth when they initially left the institutions, representatives of Srpska Lista and other Serb-led political entities decided to boycott these elections.

Albanian-led political entities exploited this situation. By participating in the boycotted elections, they won with minimal turnout and voter support - the total turnout was only 3.47%.[3] Since then, for over two years, the Serb-majority municipalities in North Kosovo have been governed by illegitimate ethnic Albanian mayors and municipal assemblies predominantly constituted by ethnic Albanian councilors.[4]

Consequences of the Interim Governance

From the inauguration period - already marked by escalation on the ground - international actors urged the newly installed local representatives to limit their role to “technical” decisions and to operate from alternative locations. This, however, did not happen.

The government's unilateral approach, which led to the emergence of illegitimate local administrations and the inaugurational chaos that followed[5], created a dangerous institutional and security environment in the North. This environment, characterized by a vacuum of legitimate authority and heightened tensions, eventually culminated in the Banjska attack of September 24, 2023 - the most serious outbreak of violence in years. Its aftermath prompted an even stronger securitization of the region by the Kosovo government, reflected in the larger deployment of heavily armed police units, frequent raids, and the establishment of increased checkpoints. These developments further eroded interethnic trust and entrenched a perception of collective punishment among the local Serb population.

Recognizing that the situation was not sustainable in the long term, international actors pressured Kosovo’s authorities to create legal conditions for holding a referendum on the dismissal of the mayors. The process was forced from the outset - essentially offering a solution for the sake of having one, even though it was impossible to implement - and, coupled with numerous shortcomings, made it clear that the situation could not be resolved in this way. As a result, the Serb population largely boycotted the referendum held on April 21, 2024[6].

Meanwhile, in parallel with the central authorities, the new local leadership has continued to exacerbate tensions through a series of controversial decisions and a consistently non-cooperative approach. This combination of institutional exclusion and intensified security presence has significantly worsened the daily life of Serbs in the region, undermining prospects for any meaningful normalization at the local level.

The "Liberation" Narrative: Propaganda vs. Reality

With this in mind, the new elections are being advertised by Srpska Lista as a chance for the "liberation" of North Kosovo from the repressive current administration, through the return to power of Serb political representatives.

However, such announcements are a form of electoral propaganda for several reasons:

1. Limited Scope of Victory: Following an eventual victory by Serb political representatives, the "liberation" will only encompass the positions of mayors and municipal assembly members. While these positions are not insignificant and carry specific competencies, they will be more or less the only ones to be refilled by Serbs. It is difficult to imagine that the same will happen with all the municipal workers who left their jobs and have since been replaced.
2. Unchanged Central Systems: The situation regarding the ethnic composition of the police and judiciary - areas where the fallacy of the decision to leave institutions was perhaps best demonstrated - will remain fundamentally unchanged.
3. Worsened General Situation: The general situation for the Serb community, especially in the North, has drastically changed in recent years due to repressive decisions from the central level. These include the ban on the import of Serbia-made goods, the “abolition of usage of the Serbian dinar currency (RSD)”, the closure of Serbia-run institutions, the securitization of North Kosovo, and the general takeover of control by Kosovo’s system. These actions have significantly changed the reality on the ground and prompted a considerable number of Serbs to leave Kosovo. Therefore, a victory in the local elections certainly cannot bring the promised "liberation."
4. Root of the Problems: Local-level problems have their roots in the broader Kosovo-Serbia relations. Thus, they cannot be expected to be solved locally, as they did not originate there.[GG3] [AS4] 

The Actors and Campaign Tensions

Regarding the actors in the Kosovo-Serb political spectrum, alongside Srpska Lista, which is the favorite to win in all 10 Serb-majority municipalities, the Serb community will be represented by candidates from the following parties and civic initiatives: Srpska Demokratija (Serbian Democracy), Za slobodu, pravdu i opstanak (For Freedom, Justice, and Survival), Srpski Narodni Pokret (Serb People's Movement), Kosovski Savez (Kosovo Alliance), as well as civic initiatives: Sever za sve (North for All) and Novo lice, narodna pravda (New Face, People's Justice), along with a few smaller movements or independent candidates.

The period before the campaign and the campaign itself have been marked by tensions and obstructions, meaning the environment in which the elections are taking place cannot be characterized as favorable.

Obstruction and Intimidation Tactics[GG5] [AS6] 

1. Challenging Participation Rights: As was the case in previous parliamentary elections, the ruling structure attempted to challenge the right to participate for certain political entities representing the Serb community - specifically Srpska Lista and Srpska Demokratija[AS7] .
2. Contested Legal Action Against Opposition Leader: The leader of Srpska Demokratija, Aleksandar Arsenijević, is currently outside Kosovo after being placed under investigation following the discovery of weapons by the Kosovo Police in a property he owns, a claim he denies, alleging he was set up. He remains in Serbia, reportedly afraid of being arrested and convicted in what he describes as a set-up process.
3. Voter List Discrepancies[AS8] : Attempts at obstruction were noted in the context of voter lists, where a drastic difference was observed in certain Serb-majority municipalities compared to the parliamentary elections held just a few months earlier. For example, Gračanica/Graçanicë reportedly saw over 2,000 new voters, while there was a significant decrease in the municipalities of Leposavić/q and North Mitrovica - over 1,000 voters.[7]
4. Electoral Board Issues: Srpska Lista highlighted the problem of the unequal and unlawful distribution of polling station committee members to their detriment - being allotted a lower number of members than legally prescribed - similar to the situation during the parliamentary elections.[8]
5. "Traditional" Pressures: In addition to these pressures on the electoral competition, there are the "traditional" pressures on the freedom of electoral will of voters - threats, blackmail, and "vote buying".

This phenomenon is compounded by the political environment: Gračanica/Graçanicë is the only municipality where an Albanian-led coalition (VV, PDK, LDK) has formed to run in the local elections. This situation suggests that the focus of major central majority-community parties appears to be on asserting political control in non-majority areas rather than genuinely promoting local integration and democratic participation. While it does not seem possible for this coalition to win a majority, these combined trends - the united political front and the unusual changes in the voter registry - have created a raised level of fear among Serb citizens that such an outcome might occur.

Dominance of Srpska Lista and Political Coercion

Srpska Lista certainly dominates in this regard, primarily by manipulating and using resources from the budget of the Republic of Serbia, as well as the influence they hold over the management of Serbia-run institutions. This influence translates into coercive employment leverage, enabling them to pressure voters by threatening job termination or promising employment to influence the electoral will. However, a similar practice has been seen from the party Za slobodu, pravdu i opstanak, led by the current "illegal" minister in the technical mandate, Nenad Rašić, who also utilizes resources - albeit from the Kosovo system - to influence the electoral will of voters, or colloquially - „buying votes“.

Conclusion: Expected Outcome and Future Impact

Considering all of the above, there is still no doubt that Srpska Lista is the absolute favorite in the municipalities with a Serb majority. The opposition will certainly win a few council seats, as will the Albanian-led parties, but given that the Serb opposition is fragmented and somewhat feuding, and the Albanian opposition is still not strong enough, it would be a real surprise to see Srpska Lista lose the majority in any municipality.

However, such an outcome might bring a certain degree of relaxation for members of the Serb community, at least in the context of the municipalities in North Kosovo. But such a change will not bring anything substantially different from the current state - an illegitimate and nationalist administration will be replaced by a corrupt and criminal leadership with which citizens are well acquainted.

The situation will certainly be further complicated by the quasi-cohabitation that will exist between the new local government and the rest of the local and central system, which will seek to obstruct their autonomy at the local level. Without significant engagement from international actors in resolving this permanent, years-long crisis at the level of high-level politics, the citizens on the ground will continue to pay the highest price.